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   1
LAND REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL LAND 




Russia has experienced dramatic changes in land ownership and tenure since 1991: agricultural 
land has been largely privatized, individual landowners now have legal rights to most agricultural land 
in the country, and prohibitions on buying and selling of land have been recently removed. The 
necessary pre-conditions for the development of agricultural land markets have been met and we are 
beginning to witness transactions that involve individual landowners, and not only the state. Further 
development of the land market is circumscribed by the inadequacy of the administrative and technical 
infrastructure. The paper discusses the evolving legal framework for land reform,  considedrs the 
impacts on privatization and ownership structure of agricultural land, and analyzes the development of 
land market transactions. The analysis uses official statistical sources and the results of a 2003 survey 
in three regions.  
Keywords: land reform, land market, land leasing, transition. 
JEL classification: P23, P26, P31, P32, Q15. 
  
This paper examines the dramatic changes in land ownership and land tenure that have occurred 
in Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. We start with a discussion of the 
legal framework for land reform that crystallized in the early 1990s and has continued to evolve 
dynamically ever since, consider the impacts of land reform on privatization and ownership structure 
of agricultural land, and analyze the development of land market transactions. The analysis is based on 
official national sources and the results of a questionnaire-based survey conducted by the authors in 
2003 a part of a BASIS/CRS research project (referred to as 2003 BASIS survey in the text). We 
conclude with a review of the existing constraints on land transactions and some policy 
recommendations. 
 
1. Legal Framework and Land Reform Outcomes 
 
Russia’s agricultural land area has remained remarkably stable at 220 million hectares since 1990. 
On the other hand, agricultural land used by producers (both corporate and individual farms) dropped 
from 214 million hectares in 1991 to 195 million hectares in 2003 – a decrease of 16% during the 
transition. Most of this “missing” land was transferred to the state land reserve, which is a pool of land 
available for allocation to producers but not currently in use. Table 1 shows the structure of 
agricultural land resources by users in 1991 and 2003. In addition to the features discussed above, it 
demonstrates the substantial transfer of land from corporate farms (former kolkhozes and sovkhozes) 
to the individual sector: corporate farms lost 59 million hectares, or nearly 30% of their total land 
endowment in 1991, while the individual sector gained 40 million hectares (the remainder was 
absorbed in the state reserve and by user reclassification).  
 
Table 1. Structure of agricultural land by users 1991 and 2003 (beginning of year) 
Million hectares  Percent   
2003 1991 2003 1991 
Total agricultural land  220.9  222.1  100.0  100.0 
Used by farms  194.6  213.8  88.1  96.3 
 corporate  farms  150.4  209.8  68.1  94.5 
  peasant  farms  17.0 0.1 7.7 0.0 
  household  plots  11.8 3.9 5.3 1.8 
 municipal  meadows  and 
  pastures in household use 
15.4 0  7.0 0 
Reserve  land  13.8 1.8 6.2 0.8 
Other  users  12.5 6.5 5.7 2.9 
Source:  Goskomstat (2003a).   2
Reform Legislation 
 
Land in Russia (and in other parts of the former czarist empire) was nationalized within days of 
the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917, as Lenin’s Decree on Land (Dekret o zemle) transferred all 
land to the state and prohibited private land ownership. Land nationalized was followed in 1929-30 by 
forced collectivization, and by the end of the 1930s a relatively small number of “socialized” farms 
(about 30,000 in total) controlled 98% of agricultural land. Despite pervasive collectivization and 
monopolistic state ownership of land, private agriculture persisted in the form of millions of small 
household plots of less than 0.5 hectare cultivated by rural residents. 
After more than seven decades of state monopoly in land ownership, the first signs of readiness to 
reform the Soviet land-tenure system appeared in 1989, when the traditional policy of giving state land 
in use rights only was relaxed and a new category of lifetime inheritable possession (pozhiznennoe 
nasleduemoe vladenie) was introduced. Security of tenure was formally ensured, but land transactions 
(including subleasing) were absolutely prohibited. In October 1990, more than a year before the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia passed the Land Reform Law and adopted a constitutional 
amendment that actually recognized the right of private ownership in agricultural land. As a 
compromise, however, the amendment imposed a 10-year moratorium on buying and selling of land in 
private ownership and restricted alienation of land to the state (and not to other landowners). This legal 
restriction remained in force until 2003. 
The trail-blazing constitutional amendment was followed by the Russian Law on Peasant Farms 
(December 1990), which legalized private farming, allowed distribution of collective land in the form 
of paper shares to members, and provided the option of withdrawing land plots for the establishment of 
an independent peasant farm outside the collectivist framework. Russia’s new Land Code passed in 
April 1991 formalized these various legal initiatives and laid the road for mass privatization of 
agricultural land.  
Land ownership is an emotionally charged issue in Russia. The passage of reform-oriented land 
laws was accompanied by dramatic political debates, and the sharply opposed positions of the reform-
minded executive and the highly conservative legislature prevented the development of a full-fledged 
legal privatization mechanism for more than a decade. The main sticking point was the right to buy 
and sell privately owned land – a basic inalienable right associated with private land ownership in 
market economies. The two branches of government could not agree on this point, and all the legal 
advances since mid-1991 were realized in the form of presidential decrees and government resolutions 
– temporary instruments that required ultimate codification in permanent laws. Ownership rights in 
agricultural land (including buying and selling) were finally normalized in January 2003, when the 
Law on Agricultural Land Transactions came into force.  
In 1991, agricultural land held by collective and state farms began to be distributed in the form of 
land shares to individuals, who could then withdraw their land allocation for the establishment of a 
peasant farm. Alienation of land in peasant farms was allowed only to the state (in practice, to local 
authorities), not to other individuals. Starting in early 1992, land shares still held in the form of paper 
certificates could be sold to other members of the collective or to the collective farm as a legal body; 
physical land plots could be sold only under special circumstances (when the landowner retired, when 
the plot was passed in inheritance, when the peasant farmer relocated to another region, or when the 
seller undertook to use the proceeds from the sale of land for the establishment of a non-farm 
business). Procedures adopted in March 1993 allowed buying and selling of land for household plots 
and other individual uses (dachas, gardening, individual housing). 
In practice, the legal ban on buying and selling of agricultural land was bypassed even before 
January 2003 by presidential decrees and government resolutions. These decrees and resolutions 
allowed buying and selling of land shares (first to other members of the collective, and since October 
1993 practically to any buyer). Having purchased a land share, the new shareowner could request its 
conversion into a land plot. The transferability of land shares has led to substantial redistribution of 
land ownership and land use in former collective farms. Presidential decrees and government 
resolutions also allowed (since October 1993) conversion of land shares into physical plots for 
household farming. Once the ownership of the new addition to the household plot was officially 
registered, it could be sold and bought in accordance with the different rules applicable (since May 
1993) to land in household plots. A market has thus emerged for relatively small plots created through   3
conversion of land shares by family members. The national average land share was about 10 hectares, 
and some regions actually allowed expansion of household plots to the combined size of the land 
shares held by all family members. In principle, the size of a household plot in the fields outside the 
village limits could thus reach several tens of hectares, which is comparable with the average size of a 
peasant farm.  
Beyond the psychological opposition to buying and selling of land, other emotional issues 
included the concern about concentration of land ownership in the hands of few physical persons or 
corporations (“latifundiazation” of agricultural land), the fear of excessive fragmentation of land 
during privatization, loss of land holdings by former collective farms due to their weak financial 
situation and danger of bankruptcy, and that perennial bogey, the sale of Russian land to foreigners. 
The provisions of the 2003 Law of Agricultural Land Transactions were designed to address these 
concerns. While buying and selling of land plots (as well as land shares) was allowed, the state 
retained a preemptive right on land purchases; regional governments could impose limits on physical 
concentration of land by a single owner (typically 10% of the agricultural land in the district), on the 
one hand, and also limits on the minimum size of physical plots that could be surveyed and registered 
for farming purposes (household plots were exempt from this restriction); foreigner and companies 




Contrary to the Baltic states and most countries in East Central Europe, Russia chose to privatize 
agricultural land by distribution to users, not restitution to former owners. The initial legislation in 
1989-91 focused on the principle of private ownership of land and the procedures for distribution of 
state land for individual farming (household plots, small-scale gardeners and vegetable growers, 
peasant farmers). Mass privatization was launched in 1991-92, when large chunks of state land were 
privatized into joint ownership of the rural people who lived and worked in collective and state farms. 
This formal privatization affected most of the agricultural land in collective and state farms, while the 
rest of agricultural land and other rural land (including land under farm buildings, for instance) 
remained state property (creating the so-called redistribution reserve for future municipal and farming 
needs). The privatized land was then divided into equal shares, and each adult – collective farm 
worker, pensioner, or employee of rural social services – received one land share. The size of the share 
was determined by land availability in the district and was rigidly controlled.  
A land share is a paper entitlement of fractional ownership in the agricultural land transferred by 
the state to the collective. This mechanism created a new ownership category that became known as 
“joint shared ownership”. This was no longer state ownership (hence the use of the term 
“privatization”), but it was not individual ownership either. The reform laws typically allowed 
shareowners to withdraw physical land plots from joint shared ownership into individual ownership, 
but the requirement to survey and register the plot (with all the attendant costs and administrative 
complications) was deferred to the time in the future when the shareowner would actually decide to 
withdraw his or her land from the common pool of owners. 
Russian land privatization quickly produced 11.9 million shareowners with land shares covering 
117.6 million hectares, or 9.9 hectares per share. By 1995 the state had privatized through land shares 
fully 56% of the original 209.8 million hectares controlled by former collective and state farms at the 
beginning of reform. The remaining land was transferred to the state redistribution reserve, which 
provided the pool of land for future creation of peasant farms, expansion of household plots, and 
various municipal needs.  
The distribution of land shares immediately placed the shareowners in a decision node: they could 
choose to start an independent business by withdrawing their land from the collective; on the other 
hand, they did not have to do that, as they could simply leave their land shares in joint cultivation by 
the existing collective farm (which meanwhile had reorganized as a corporate farm in one of the 
standard organizational forms, such as shareholding company, limited liability company, partnership, 
or agricultural cooperative). It was clear from the outset that most shareowners would not start an 
independent farm and instead would prefer to keep their land shares in the collective. It suffices to 
mention that in 1992 half the shareowners were elderly pensioners. With time, rural people developed 
mixed conversion strategies, with several members of the same family or groups of relatives and   4
neighbors pooling their paper shares to receive one contiguous land plot in return. One of the villages 
in Leningrad Oblast provides a typical example of such “home-made consolidation”: 6 families 
holding jointly 17 land shares were allotted 6 consolidated plots, with each family receiving a single 
plot of appropriate size, regardless of whether its individual members had 2, 3, or 5 land shares. This 
share consolidation strategy is a natural response to the concerns about excessive fragmentation of 
individual land plots. In retrospect, distribution of land shares has proved more effective and less 
costly for land consolidation than distribution of physical plots. This is evident from any comparison 
with the experience in East Central Europe, where land fragmentation and consolidation efforts are 
still a major issue after nearly fifteen years of transition. 
The privatization process itself provided the trigger for the first land market transactions in 
Russia. The former collective and state farms, now reorganized as corporate farms of various types, 
were formally left without any land for farming. They had to turn back to the newly created 
shareowners and lease their land shares or alternatively entice them to invest their land shares in the 
equity capital of the corporate farms. Initially, it was not too difficult to persuade the new shareowners 
not to withdraw their land and to let the corporate farm continue using it. However, as time went on 
and people began to get used to the new market mechanisms, some shareowners would withdraw their 
land from the former collective farm and lease it to another producer offering more competitive terms. 
A shareowner actually could avoid the bureaucratic hassle of withdrawing a land plot and simply lease 
out the land share. The lessor would then negotiate for a specific plot with the manager of the 
collective farm where the share was originally used. A two-tier leasing system has thus developed: 
leasing of land shares from individual shareowners (either by the original corporate farm or by other 
producers) and leasing of land plots from individuals who have independently converted their land 
share into a plot. All in all, it seems that the Russian land privatization strategy, based on distribution 
of land shares instead of the more conventional (to the Western observer) distribution of individual 
land plots, has had clear beneficial effects on the level of transaction costs, although possibly it 
delayed the productivity improvements normally associated with individual ownership and control of 
land. The 2003 Law on Agricultural Land Transactions has interfered with this established process by 
prohibiting leasing of land shares and requiring that a land share be converted into a physical plot 
before it could be leased. However, the conversion of land shares into plots involves substantial costs 
and bureaucratic complications (see section 3).  
In addition to transactions in private land, there are naturally transactions involving state-owned 
land. Original distributions of state land to peasant farmers and households (up to specific limits) were 
free. After that, state land has to be leased or purchased. Both types of transactions for state land 
legally require an auction or at least a bidding process, but in many cases this requirement is bypassed 
in practice.  
 
Land Ownership Structure 
 
The structure of agricultural land ownership that has emerged as a result of privatization is 
presented in Table 2. The share of state-owned agricultural land dropped from 100% before 1990 to 
around 40% today. Nearly 60% of agricultural land is now privately owned, but most of this land 
(51%) is represented by land shares – abstract (though transferable) pieces of paper corresponding to 
virtual plots. Only 6% of agricultural land is in the form of physically demarcated plots, most of it 
owned by individuals (household plots and peasant farms).   
Examining the structure of land ownership by three main categories of users (corporate farms, 
peasant farms, and household plots), we see an astonishing similarity between corporate farms and 
household plots (Figure 1). For both types, about 30% of the land is state-owned and close to 70% is 
land owned by private individuals; land in corporate private ownership (leased from other corporate 
farms or invested by shareowners in the equity capital) accounts for a negligible 1%-2%. However, 
there is a huge difference in the kind of individual land ownership between corporate farms and 
household plots: virtually all individually owned land in corporate farms is in the form of land shares 
owned by the local rural population, while in household plots this is physically demarcated private 
land. Peasant farms have a smaller component of individually owned private land (about 40%, all of it 
in the form of physical plots) and they rely to a greater extent on land leased from the state and on land   5
shares leased from outside owners who are not family members. This component of land leased in the 
form of shares from outsiders accounts for 18% of total holdings in peasant farms (shown as “other” in 
Figure 1). Some of the state land in individual farms is still reported in the old tenure forms (use rights 
or possession). Eventually this land will be transferred to private ownership of the users, increasing the 
component of individually owned land by as much as 25% in household plots and 15% in peasant 
farms.  
 
Table 2. Agricultural land ownership 2003  
  Million ha  Percent 
Total agricultural land  220.9  100 
Privately owned (as reported)  127.5  58 
  Individuals: land shares  112.7  51 
 Individuals:  plots
1  12.1  5 
 Corporations
1  2.7  1 
State owned (by difference)  93.4  42 
Source: Total agricultural land from Goskomstat (2003a); breakdown by ownership fromRoszemkadastr (2002a), 
рp. 49, 57, 100, 109, and Roszemkadastr (2004), рp. 13, 253, 604, 616. 
1About 2.5 million hectares held in peasant farms registered as legal bodies has been moved from the category of 
corporations (where it is formally reported) to the category of individual plots. 
 
Since 88% of privately owned land is represented by land shares (Table 2), it may be instructive 
to look at the disposition of land shares in corporate farms. According to Roszemkadastr data for 2004, 
64% of the land shares are leased by corporate farms from individuals and 12% are given to corporate 
farms in use rights. The remaining 24% is represented by unclaimed land shares of beneficiaries who 
have died, left the village, or failed to exercise their right for other reasons (e.g., did not want to pay 
for the share certificate). The local corporate farm continues to use the unclaimed land shares by 
default. 
The basic land privatization mechanism—distribution of land shares accompanied by the option 
of individual or group withdrawal with land—has created the basis for redistribution of agricultural 
land among users. In Lodeinopl’skii Raion in Leningrad Oblast, a local financial crisis provided a 
stimulus for a spate of reorganizations, which included creation of new corporate farms as well as 
expansion of peasant farms and household plots. The process did not involve any buying and selling of 
land and it was enabled by a flow of land shares from owners to new users. Among the six former 
collective farms in the district, more than 50% of land resources were redistributed by land share 
transfers. Most of the land was absorbed by new corporate farms (primarily through leasing), but about 
10% of the land shares were taken up by peasant farms and household plots with the purpose of 
expanding their holdings. The remaining 48% of the land shares did not find new users, in part because 
the shareowners had died or left without assigning their use rights (about 20% of the shares). By 
Figure 1. Structure of land ownership by farm type 2001.












default, these shares continue to be used by the (greatly downsized) former collectives. This example 
with half the land shares transferred to new users and the other half remaining by default with the 
original user—a former collective farm—is typical of agriculturally poor regions, where the demand 
for land is weak.  
 
2. Emergence of Land Markets 
 
Land market transactions are divided into two main categories: buy-and-sell transactions that 
involve transfer of legal ownership; and leasing transactions that involve transfer of use rights from 
owner to tenant without change of ownership. The existing registration procedures ensure a fairly 
complete record of transactions in state land (both leasing and buying), but they do not capture any 
leasing transactions between individuals – whether plots or land shares. Buying and selling of land 
plots between private individuals and corporations is in principle covered by the statistics, but only to 
the extent that the buyers and sellers choose to go through the bureaucratic difficulties of registering 
the transaction (see section 3). Table 3 presents the structure of transactions in agricultural land, which 
constituted one-third of the total number of 5.6 million transactions in 2001. 
 
Table 3. Transactions in agricultural land 2001: national statistics 
  Number of transactions, ‘000  Percent 
Leasing of state land to households  1,695.6  93.0 
Leasing of state land to agricultural producers  81.4  4.5 
Sale of state land to households  2.6  0.1 
Sale of private land to households   44.5  2.4 
Total transactions in agricultural land  1,824.1  100.0 
Source: Estimated from Roszemkadastr (2002b), pp. 46, 52, 78, 84, 111, 113, 115. Data for later years not 
available. 
 
Buying and selling of agricultural land by individuals is miniscule compared to land leasing from 
the state and shareowners. Statistics record 150,000 land-sale transactions annually between private 
landowners in villages, and the amount of land transacted is about 0.5% of their total holdings.  
Land transactions and land market constraints cannot be studied only on the basis of official 
sources because no statistical data are available on transactions in agricultural land and land shares and 
there is absolutely no information on the terms of land transactions, on the composition of buyers and 
sellers, or on supply and demand. At the present stage, the required data can be obtained only through 
specially designed questionnaire-based surveys. We carried out such surveys in three regions – Rostov, 
Ivanovo, and Nizhnii Novgorod – that differed by natural conditions, economic development, and the 
level of policy reforms. The surveys covered agricultural producers of three basic organizational forms 
(Uzun, 2005) – farm enterprises (a corporate form of organization), peasant farms, and household plots 
(two individual forms of organization). The discussion in the following subsections is based on the 
survey results. 
 
Land Market Activity 
 
The survey shows that only household plots rely mainly on owned land, while leasing is 
widespread among both corporate and peasant farms (Table 4). In corporate and peasant farms, the 
share of leased land is on average 60% of the total area of agricultural land used. In corporate farms, 
three-quarters of the leased land is in the form of land shares, and only one-quarter is leased as land 
plots. Peasant farms, on the other hand, tend to lease land plots to a greater extent (more than 40% of 
all leased land). The owned land in peasant farms consists of land shares and land plots allotted 
without payment to the members of the farm during land privatization (land in joint shared ownership), 
as well as land shares and land plots purchased in the market. The owned land of corporate farms 
consists of land shares invested by members in corporate equity capital. The share of owned land in 
corporate farms (36% in Table 4) is overestimated in part due to the incorrect interpretation of survey 
questions by the managers, who improperly regard leased land shares as land shares invested in their   7
corporate farm’s equity. According to official national statistics, the share of owned land in corporate 
farms is only 1.3% (see Roszemkadastr (2003b), p. 13). 
 
Table 4. Sources of land in the survey (percent of the total area) 






Average farm size  4100 ha  270 ha  2.6 ha 
Leased land  61  57  3 
  Leased land shares  (46)  (32)  -- 
  Leased land plots  (15)  (25)  -- 
Owned land  36  42  93 
  Purchased land shares  (2)  (30)  -- 
  Purchased land plots  (1)  (11)  -- 
   Land shares invested in equity  (33)  (1)  -- 
Other 3  1  4 
Total  100 100 100 
Source: 2003 BASIS survey. 
*The numbers in parentheses are rough estimates based on part of the respondents. 
 
Respondents in 553 farms of various organizational forms in three regions reported 97 land 
transactions during one year. The frequency of transactions was virtually the same in farms of different 
organizational forms. There was only one case of selling land. All other transactions involved land 
leasing. Strengthening the data in Table 3, this shows that land leasing is a dominant form of 
transaction in land markets across Russia, and yet most of these transactions remain outside the scope 
of official statistics.  
The survey did not detect any dependence of the frequency of land transactions on the distance 
from the regional center in the three oblasts studied. Yet we are witnessing a particularly active land 
market in areas close to Moscow and in Moscow Oblast, where land is bought for non-agricultural 
purposes. This subject requires a special study.  
 
Reported Land Transactions 
 
The incidence of land transactions in the sample is not very pronounced and basically only 
leasing transactions are reported. A total of 96 respondents (17% of the sample) report engaging in 
land lease transactions of some kind in 2001. Of these, 57 respondents (10%) report that they lease in 
additional land, 34 respondents (6%) report that they lease out land, and 4 respondents (1%) report 
both leasing in and leasing out of land. 
 
Table 5. Lease-in transactions and prices by source of land (including leasing of plots and land 
shares) 












Plots:          
     Corporate farms  22  112  5  17  480   324 
     Private individuals  18  298  29  13  576   362 
     District administration  10  163  142  8  42*    48 
     Other  6  1,102  425  2  100-143    
Total plots  56  287  28  40  405   212 
Plots from corporate farms and  
private individuals 
40 196  16  30  522  343 
Land shares from private 
individuals 
13 1,198  524  13  607  420 
Source: 2003 BASIS survey. 
 
A total of 61 respondents (11% of the sample) reported acquiring additional land by leasing in 
2001. The distribution of the frequency of transactions across the three organizational forms was not 
significantly different from uniform. The transactions included 56 instances involving leasing of   8
physical plots and 13 instances involving leasing of land shares (land shares can be leased from private 
individuals only).  
Table 5 shows the distribution of transactions by main sources of land and the estimated prices 
per hectare per year (mean and median). The prices reported for land leased from the district 
administration (40-50 rubles per hectare) were significantly lower than the prices paid to corporate 
farms and private individuals (400-500 rubles per hectare). There were no statistically significant 
differences in prices paid to private individuals for land leased in the form of plots or paper shares. 
This issue requires further study in a larger sample, as one would normally expect surveyed plots to 
fetch a higher price than land shares that involve additional transaction costs before conversion into 
physical land ready for cultivation (see also section 3). 
The average amount of land per farm acquired through land shares is significantly greater than the 
amount of land acquired by leasing of physical plots. On the other hand, there are no statistically 
significant differences in the size of physical plots leased from different sources. The median plot 
areas in Table 5 seem to suggest that smallest areas are acquired from corporate farms and largest from 
the district administration and other sources. However, the differences are not statistically significant. 
 
Table 6. Distribution of farms of different organizational forms by sources of land 
  Corporate farms (n=23)  Peasant farms (n=24)  Household plots (n=22) 
Corporate farms  22  21  55 
Private individuals – plots    22  21  36 
 –  land  shares  26  29  0 
District administration  17  21  5 
Other 13  8  4 
Total 100  100  100 
Source: 2003 BASIS survey. 
 
There are no significant differences in access to different sources of land for corporate farms and 
peasant farms (Table 6). Unlike corporate and peasant farms, household plots do not lease land shares: 
they only lease land plots – mainly from corporate farms and to a certain extent also from private 
individuals. Their transactions with the district administration are minimal. This is also in contrast to 
corporate and peasant farms, for which more than 25% of lease transactions are with the district 
administration. These differences in the pattern of leasing sources, and specifically the preference of 
household plots for leasing land from corporate farms, may explain the observation in Table 5 
according to which the smallest plots are acquired from corporate farms. 
In addition to 61 respondents who lease in land, 38 respondents (7% of the sample) report leasing 
out land. It is mostly corporate farms that lease out land (13%), presumably because of lack of 
profitability and inadequate business opportunities. At the other extreme, only 1% of peasant farms 
lease out land – for exactly the same reasons, but in reverse. Household plots fall in between, with 9% 
leasing out land. A working hypothesis suggests that these are probably plots of older families, 
although lack of household demographic data in the survey instruments makes it impossible to check 
this hypothesis. The survey only reveals that farms lease out land predominantly because they are 
unable to cultivate it themselves. This is the reason provided by 32 out of 38 lessor farms. Yet these 
responses are equally distributed among corporate farms and household plots and we cannot learn 
anything about the specific reasons for leasing out land by household plots. 
 
Table 7. Lease-out transactions and prices by source of land 












Corporate farms  29  163  13  15  467  350 
Private individuals  10  262  139  8  361  238 
Other 2  100-191    2  24-158   
Total 41  186  28  25  403  310 
Corporate farms and private 
individuals 
39 188  18  23  430  325 
Source: 2003 BASIS survey.   9
The average size and the average price received in leasing-out transactions are given in Table 7 
(means and medians in the sample). The general pattern is essentially the same as for leasing-in 
transactions (see Table 5), except that district administration is not included. Household plot operators 
lease out land exclusively to the local corporate farm. Corporate and peasant farms lease out land to 
other corporate farms and private individuals in roughly equal proportions (in such a small sample 
percentage frequencies are meaningless). In this sense, the leasing-out and leasing-in patterns are 
identical. 
 
Payment for Land 
 
Prices of leased-in and leased-out land were compared for transactions involving corporate farms 
and private individuals as lessees and lessors (see last line in Tables 5 and 7, respectively). The 
differences in prices are not statistically significant. The median price in the sample for all leasing 
transactions in these channels is 330-340 rubles per hectare. Supplementary data were obtained by 
analyzing the lease payments for land shares (median 420 rubles) and separate partial responses of 
lessees and lessors on structure of lease payments (which give 450 rubles/ha for leasing in and 440 
rubles/ha for leasing out; the difference is not statistically significant). The various numbers suggest 
median lease payments of 350-450 rubles per hectare in the sample (excluding transactions with the 
district administration, which command much lower prices). 
 
Table 8. Lease payments estimated from the survey 
Types of lease payments   Lessees, %  Structure of payments 
for leased-in land, % 
Lessors, %  Structure of payments 
for leased-out land, % 
Land  tax  45  2 13 1 
Fixed, in cash  25  20  22  17 
Fixed,  in-kind 52  57 17 22 
Share of output  9  18  43  59 
In  services  9 3 13 1 
Total *  100  *  100 
  56 respondents  451 rubles/ha  23 respondents  441 rubles/ha 
Source: 2003 BASIS survey. 
* Adds to more than 100% because of multiple answers. 
 
Most lessees made lease payments in kind; payment in cash was less common. Many lessees 
assumed the responsibility for the land tax. Lessors also indicated that lease payments were typically a 
share of the output. The mean lease payment was 440-450 rubles/ha (Table 8). Lease payments 
estimated separately for land shares gave a median of 420 rubles/ha, while the median of all leasing 
transactions in the survey was 340 rubles/ha. Thus, the lease payments range between 350-450 
rubles/ha, excluding the transactions in state land. The lease payments to the district administration for 
state land are much lower (about 50 rubles/ha, see Table 5). The differences in lease payments across 
farms of different organizational forms are not statistically significant. 
Leasing is often for medium or long term. About 50% of both lessees and lessors report leasing 
terms longer than 4 years (and in some cases even longer than 10 years).  
 
Potential for Land Transactions 
 
The potential for land transactions was examined by exploring the perceived need in farms for 
additional land (Table 9). Nearly 30% of respondents desired to increase their landholdings. This 
potential for future land transactions should be compared with the actual frequency of land leasing in 
2001, which covered 11% of respondents (uniformly distributed over the three organizational forms). 
The greatest need for additional land is expressed by peasant farmers: 50% of respondents in this 
category desire more land, compared with less than 20% among household plots and corporate farms. 
Peasant farmers who would like to increase their holdings typically have less land than the rest, 
although the difference is not dramatic (225 hectares compared with 314 hectares for those who do not 
need more land). A similar situation is observed for corporate farms (3,350 hectares compared with   10
4,320 hectares). Among household plot operators, on the other hand, the difference in land holdings 
between those who say they need more land and the rest is not significant.  
 
Table 9. Potential and actual land transactions (percent of respondents) 
  Potential: desire additional land  Actual: acquired additional land in 
2001 
All sample  29  11 
Corporate farms  18  13 
Farms 49  9 
Plots 13  11 
Source: 2003 BASIS survey. 
 
In principle, we can expect the demand for land to depend on the financial situation of farms. 
However, the only indicators of financial performance in the survey were sales revenue and surplus – a 
very crude profit-like measure of financial sources in excess of uses. Neither of these financial 
indicators showed a clear association with the perceived demand for land.  
The most common option for acquiring additional land is by leasing a plot from a private 
individual (40% of respondents with perceived need for additional land). Other accessible options (in 
multiple-choice answers) include getting a plot from the state in leasehold or use rights (35%), buying 
land shares (18%), and even buying a land plot from a private individual (17%). There are clear 
differences in potential access patterns of different organizational forms to various sources of land 
(Table 10). While corporate farms and peasant farms envisage mainly leasing from private individuals 
and the state, household plots primarily intend leasing from the corporate farm and buying from 
individuals. Buying of land shares is envisaged as a viable option only by peasant farms.  
 
Table 10. Perceived sources for acquiring additional land (percent of respondents)* 








Lease plot from individual  44  32  52  16 
Lease from the state  35  28  40  20 
Buy land shares  18  8  23  4 
Buy plot from individual  17  0  19  24 
Lease from corporate farm  16  28  9  32 
Source: 2003 BASIS survey. 
*Percentages in each column add up to more than 100% because multiple answers are allowed; “lease” includes 
also taking land in use rights. 
 
Buying land is thus not perceived as impossibility in the current environment. Indeed, fully 30% 
of respondents indicate that they would be able to get additional land in private ownership as needed. 
However, leasing is clearly perceived as the most accessible option, with more than 60% indicating 
that they would be able to lease additional land as needed.  
As there are no observations of buy-and-sell transactions in the survey, it is unfortunately 
impossible to analyze the role of access to credit and other farm-related factors as potential constraints 
in land market development. Still, it is encouraging to note the emergence of land leasing transactions 
as a first stage and the positive perception of buying and selling of land as the second stage of land 
market development in some undefined future.  
 
Estimating the Demand for Agricultural Land 
 
The holdings of existing agricultural producers, including the leased component, formed a long 
time ago, so that the observed situation does not necessarily reflect a true satisfied demand for land. 
The survey has shown that the demand for land and thus the potential for land transactions vary by 
region and by type of farm.  
In all three regions surveyed, peasant farms revealed a greater demand for land than corporate 
farms. Thus, 30%-70% of peasant farmers indicated a demand for land (Table 11). Among corporate 
farms, on the other hand, the maximum demand for land (30% of respondents) was reported in Rostov   11
(a region with a highly developed agriculture), whereas in the less developed Ivanovo and Nizhnii 
Novgorod oblasts corporate farms showed a much lower demand for land.  
 
Table 11. Land users’ intentions to reduce or enlarge their land (percent of responses) 

















Reduce  43  10  1 26 0 7 3 1 
Enlarge  3 30 14  11 67 12 30 50 
Total ag 
land, ha  98,000 420  80  99,000  460  141 271,000  57,000 
Source: 2003 BASIS survey. 
 
In Ivanovo (an example of an agriculturally depressed region), 43% of corporate farms plan to 
reduce the use of land and only 3% plan to enlarge it (Table 11). A similar trend is observed in Nizhnii 
Novgorod (an example of a region with medium agricultural development). This suggests that 
corporate farms in agriculturally less developed regions will probably shed some of their land when 
they begin re-registering their use rights in state land and lease contracts for land shares, as mandated 
by the new law. Some of the released land will be absorbed by peasant farmers, who in general seek to 
enlarge their holdings, but the growth potential of this segment is not particularly large: while 
corporate farms control tens of thousands of hectares in each oblast, all peasant farms combined have 
less than 1,000 hectares in Ivanovo and Nizhnii Novgorod. Due to the absence of other interested 
parties, much of the land released by corporate farms may remain unused. The opposite situation will 
probably occur in Rostov with its highly developed agriculture and a different specialization (more 
crops, less livestock). There will be no unused agricultural land in this oblast (Table 11), and 
unsatisfied demand for land can actually arise. 
To conclude, we see that there is a demand for land for large-scale agricultural production in 
some regions (the Rostov example). In all regions, however, peasant farmers and household-plot 
owners show less intention to reduce their holdings and more willingness to enlarge their land than 
managers of large corporate farms. This tendency does not depend on natural and climatic conditions. 
In all three regions surveyed, peasant farmers demonstrate a greater demand for land even than 
household-plot operators. Nevertheless, the physical potential of peasant farms and household plots in 
Ivanovo, Nizhnii Novgorod, and similar less developed regions is not sufficient to absorb the surplus 
land that will be released by corporate farms. 
 
Factors Determining Land Transactions 
 
We have tried using Rozsemkadastr regional data to model land transactions in a cross section of 
Russia’s 71 regions (omitting those where private land ownership is prohibited and where data are 
suspect). The registered transactions are a mixture of different types, but the main category includes 
transactions that involve leasing of state land outside the village limits by corporate and peasant farms. 
Household plots are not included in this category, since they generally lease land from municipalities 
inside the village limits.  
Our modeling exercise was subject to severe restrictions imposed by the availability of regional 
data. We have tried a model in which the total number of leasing transactions is explained by the 
following independent variables: 
•  The number of potential lessees, i.e., the number of corporate and peasant farms in the region. 
The expectation is that a higher number of potential lessees will have a positive impact on land 
leasing transactions. To allow for the possibility of differential effects of farms from the two 
categories, the number of corporate farms and the number of peasant farms were introduced 
separately. 
•  The quality of agricultural land, the expectation being that better land will increase the scope 
of leasing transactions. Land quality was represented by two alternative measures: the so-
called “cadastral price”, which is a value calculated on the basis of local fertility of land 
(Model 1), and partial productivity of land calculated as regional agricultural product per   12
hectare of agricultural land (Model 2). 
•  Availability of agricultural land in the region: more agricultural land should lead to more 
leasing transactions. 
Other a priori relevant factors, such as the financial situation of farms (farms that are better off 
would tend to engage more in leasing transactions), could not be used for lack of data.  
 
Table 12. Regression modeling of land lease transactions in a cross-section of 71 regions (2001)  
Model 1  Model 2   
Coefficient  p-level Coefficient p-level 
Mean value 
Dependent variable: number of transactions        1,131 
Number of corporate farms  -1.35  0.214  0.25  0.827  347 
Number of peasant farms  0.11  0.032  0.21  0.000  3,374 
Agricultural land in farms, ‘000 ha  0.48  0.001  0.33  0.031  2,081 
Cadastral price, ruble/ha   0.13  0.000  --  --  10,950 
Land productivity, ruble/ha  --  --  0.07  0.080  7,360 
R
2  0.545   0.42   
Source: Transactions from Roszemkadastr (2002b), pp. 46-47; agricultural land in farms from Roszemkadastr 
(2002a), pp. 113-129, 199; number of farms and productivity from Goskomstat (2001). 
 
The regression results are presented in Table 12, which also gives the mean values of the 
variables across 71 regions. On the supply side, both availability of agricultural land and land quality 
have a significant positive effect on the number of lease transactions. On the demand side, the number 
of peasant farms has a positive effect on the number of transactions, while the effect of the number of 
corporate farms is not statistically significant. This result is understandable because peasant farms 
exist in much larger numbers (nearly 3,500 peasant farms in the average region) and accordingly 
engage in more numerous transactions. The few hundred corporate farms in each region (350 on 
average) cannot produce a noticeable impact on the total number of transactions. 
Land transactions are naturally driven by additional factors that could not be formalized for 
analysis due to lack of data. Three groups of factors appear to be conducive to the development of land 
transactions in rural areas. These factors include the general poverty of the rural population, which 
often drives families to sell their property for cash in response to the first offer made by outsiders; the 
inability of current land users to pay competitive rates, which encourages rural landowners to look for 
new clients for their land; and the emergence of cash-rich non-agricultural companies looking for new 
investment opportunities in agriculture (see Rylko and Jolly (2005) for more details on the latter 
phenomenon).  
 
3. Constraints on Land Transactions 
 
Analyzing the 2003 BASIS survey and Roszemkadastr data on sources of land used by 
agricultural producers, we conclude that farms of all types heavily rely on leased land and some even 
purchase land from individual and corporate owners. Yet the state land registry contains records of 
relatively few transactions that represent a very small portion of agricultural land. Two main groups of 
reasons may be responsible for this curious state of affairs. First, there is a general lack of market 
information pertinent to land transactions. The agents do not have sufficient knowledge of mechanisms 
and procedures necessary for registration of land transactions. Many rural people still do not know that 
land transaction are allowed and prefer to deal informally; many do not know how to draw up a 
contract or where to get standard forms for this purpose. Second, the legal registration procedures are 
very cumbersome, costly, and time-consuming. People may be avoiding land registration because of 
such bureaucratic barriers.  
These groups of obstacles have been suggested by the analysis of the survey responses as 
summarized in Table 13. It may be instructive to note some differences across farms of different 
organizational types. Thus, the large corporate farms and the small household plots both feel that they 
can disregard the registration requirements. This is much less so for peasant farms, who are apparently 
much more sensitive to the protection they get through land registration. At the same time, peasant 
farmers complain much more frequently of high registration costs and complex procedures. Somewhat   13
paradoxically, however, more than one-third of the peasant farmers report that the registration 
procedures are clear and they have no problems in that respect (last line in Table 13). 
 
Table 13. Main constraints to registration of land transactions (percent of respondents) 








No need to register  42  44  17  69 
Lack of information  18  23  11  23 
High costs  19  10  34  7 
Complex procedures  16  15  25  6 
Clear procedures, no problems  23  23  36  9 
Source: 2003 BASIS survey; numbers do not add up to 100% because multiple answers were allowed. 
 
Lack of Market Information  
 
The respondents in the 2003 BASIS survey were asked if land transactions were permitted, if they 
knew the land prices, if they knew where to find a standard lease contract form and how to register a 
transaction. With the exception of Rostov peasant farmers (12%), 22%-32% of respondents indicated 
that lack of information on these matters was a problem for engaging in land transactions. Land price 
information and transaction registration procedures were mentioned as the most important obstacles. 
The respondents did not know the prevailing land prices. The survey showed that many (though 
not all) knew the land tax rate: 33%-50% of respondents in different groups knew what the land tax 
was because they paid it once or twice a year. However, most respondents could not answer the other 
questions. The response rate was highest among the peasant farmers in Rostov, where land 
transactions were more frequent and the interest in the enlargement of holdings greater (Table 14). The 
fact that most respondents did not know the prevailing land prices apparently means that there are no 
established prices for land. There is no benchmark that could help rural people with the decision to sell 
or lease land.  
 
Table 14. Frequency of responses to land-price questions (percent)  















Lease payment for state land  20  20  3  8  11  14  46 
Lease payment for land share  17  50  2  5  12  26  49 
Land  tax    40 70 34  49  45  53 47 
Price of land share  3  0  1  3  1  9  27 
Price  of  state  land  0 0 0  0  2  0 2 
Price of land in corporate farms  0  0  0  3  2  1  1 
Number  of  respondents  35 10 94  39  93  70  209 
Source: 2003 BASIS survey. 
 
The issue of market price of land is of special importance because the 2003 Federal Law on 
Agricultural Land Transactions mandates the use of market prices in the process of the partition of a 
land in joint shared ownership (i.e., when converting land shares into plots). According to this law, 
disputes between withdrawing and remaining owners are resolved by applying the market price of 
specific land plots (on a per share basis). If the agricultural land market is not developed and there are 
no consistent land prices in the district, it is impossible to speak of the market price of specific fields 
and plots. This is a severe barrier to the partition of joint shared land and to the withdrawal of share 
owners with land plots for individual farming.  
 
High Registration Costs and Complex Procedures 
 
Expert judgments suggest that high registration costs and complex procedures are an obstacle to 
land transactions. This view is confirmed by the responses of the Rostov peasant farmers, who have 
the strongest tendency toward land enlargement. Most of the peasant farmers in Rostov (84%) indeed   14
regard these two issues as a major problem (Table 15; in other regions, where land markets are less 
developed, a much smaller percentage of respondents addressed these issues).  
 
Table 15. Are high registration costs and complex procedures an obstacle to land transactions? 
(percent of yes responses)  
Regions  Peasant farms and household plots  Corporate farms 
Ivanovo   10  12 
Nizhnii Novgorod   15  5 
Rostov   84  58 
Source: 2003 BASIS survey. 
 
The analysis of registration procedures shows that government bodies have created numerous 
administrative and organizational restrictions to land registration. The current system suffers from at 
least two serious problems. The first problem is the refusal of the cadastral chambers to issue registry 
extracts for land plots in joint shared ownership. In theory previously issued certificates of land 
ownership rights have the same validity as new entries in land registers, but in practice each new 
transaction requires full registration of the previous rights. As a result the whole area in joint shared 
ownership (often several thousand hectares) has to be surveyed. This is not only a very expensive 
operation (500 rubles per hectare), but it also takes a long time to complete (at least two months). The 
second problem is the multi-step and absolutely opaque operation of the registration and cadastral 
chambers, especially regarding the requirements for documents. These bodies develop internal 
instructions that are not always compatible with the relevant law and require additional documents that 
were not envisaged by the law. These administrative barriers involve additional expenses for the 
applicants and lead to a sharp increase of transaction costs.Personal experience suggests thatthe 
withdrawal of a single land plot from joint shared ownership requires up to one year of constant 
occupation. The cost of the entire procedure of converting a land share into a plot of land can be 
estimated by comparing the market price of a land share with the market price of a registered plot in 
the same area. In Volokolamsk near Moscow the price of a plot is double the price of a land share 
before conversion.  
While the registration procedure is determined by law, the law does not specify the precise 
requirements for documents. That is why officials at the local level set their own demands. In Moscow 
Oblast, nine out of the ten steps that an applicant has to complete are not prescribed by the law, require 
submission of additional documents, or are part of a list of verbal requirements that are not listed in 
any official document. In this situation, corporations that can afford to hire advisors and have 
specialized staff responsible for transaction registration are in an advantageous position. This is a 
typical example of market asymmetry, where some agents have more information than others by virtue 
of their official position, greater financial possibilities, or the ability to hire experts. Land-share 
owners, peasant farmers, and traditional corporate farms are weak players in this process: they have to 
spend so much time and money on registration that they often simply give up their rights or use land 
that is not legally registered. 
In order to simplify the land purchase procedure, buyers resort to general power of attorney or 
give the land away as a gift. With general power of attorney, the seller gets the money and empowers a 
third person to sell the land share and complete all the necessary arrangements. With a gift of land, 
there is no need to offer the share to other pre-emptive buyers (the joint owners, the oblast 
government, or the municipality). These “under-registration” mechanisms are risky for the buyer, as a 
power of attorney can be revoked before the registration of rights transfer to the buyer is completed, 
and a gift can be annulled as a fictitious transaction. Still, buyers are willing to take the risk because 
the prices of land grow so fast (the price of land in Mozhaisk near Moscow increased by a factor of 20 




Russia has met the necessary pre-conditions for the development of agricultural land markets: 
agricultural land has been largely privatized, individual landowners have legal rights to most 
agricultural land in the country, and previous prohibitions on buying and selling of land have been   15
removed by recent laws. Land markets have responded positively to these changes and we are 
beginning to witness transactions that involve individual landowners, and not only the state. While the 
Russian media, politicians, and scholars generally argue that market development is restricted by the 
low demand for agricultural land, our survey results seem to indicate that this is not really so: a 
substantial proportion of farms in some regions are actually interested in expanding their holdings.  
However, further development of the embryonic land market is severely circumscribed by the 
inadequacy of the administrative and technical infrastructure. There is no public registry of plans and 
maps that can be used to complete the transactions, the bureaucracy has created numerous procedural 
obstacles that complicate land transactions, and the agents effectively do not have access to market 
information about land prices or demand and supply of land. All these factors contribute to very high 
transaction costs in land markets. In the absence of competitive demand for agricultural land in many 
regions, landowners have no motivation to complete the required procedures for registration of their 
property rights, be it registration of land shares or physical plots. The actual costs are simply not 
justified by the expected benefits from making their property “ready for the market”.  
Market constraints – both legal and administrative – exist in all countries in the world. The Treaty 
of Rome, which governs the accession to the European Union, recognizes the right of member 
countries to keep their national property rules, and the new members have received a special 
permission to maintain constraints on land markets during the next decade. Yet restrictions on 
transferability of land and general non-transparency from which land markets so often suffer 
throughout the world (and not only in Russia) are serious obstacles to achieving economic efficiency. 
In Russia, particular attention is required to creation of adequate market information systems and 
significant reduction of transaction costs. Measures in these areas hopefully will alleviate the main 
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